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(lt~r:-
STATEMENT OF POIN'f~ 
POINT I-The court d~d not err in its construction 
of the Traugott deed (Plaintiff's Exhibit~ 
in that the court placed an unwarranted and 
unreasonable construction upon said. deed byJ· 
limiting the right of access to the one rod 
strip of land to a point near the center of 
the Ashby property, and excluding the appeaJ 
ing Defen~ants from access to and from cro~ 
ing said border strip in any other manner 1 
whatsoever. 1 , 
I 
! 
POINT II- The court did not err in finding that ~ 
D~fendants Christensen have no right of war 
across or right of access to the premises 




III-The court did not err in entering the 
following findings: No. 8 on page 2 of its 
findings; No. 11 on page 3; No. 1 on page 
4; No. 2 on page 4, 5, and 6; No. 5 on page A 
7; No. 1 on page 8; No. 6 on page 10; No. 7 a 
on page 10; because said findings are not ! & 
supported by the evidence. .~~ ~ 
~ 
IV-The court did not err in entering the • 
following conclusions of law: No. 1 on pag • 
10 and 11 of the findings and conclusions; ~ 
No. 2 page 11; No. 5 page 11. N~ 
1e! 
V-The court did not err in directing the de: 
fendants to remove any and all items which 
may polute the water supply to a reasonable 
distance from the said water supply withe~ ~ 
finding which items, if any, existing upon 11 AI 
any of the property will or may pollute the 
water su_pply. 
POINT VI-The court did not err in failing to re-
strain Plaintiffs from building a fence or 
other obstruction along or upon the one ro 
strip of land. 
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~IEL VIN WOOD, LA VORA S. 
vVOOD, LOY WOOD, ALVIN WOOD, 
~IINNIE ROSE WOOD, HAROLD 
C.WEATHERSON,ATHELENE 
WEATHERSON, CHARLES WOOD 
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No. 7667 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS AND THE ISSUE 
The Brief of the defendant and appellant states the 
facts of the case adequately with the further explanation 
that Mikesell was not made a party to the action as 
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Mikesell's property had been purchased by one of the 
respondents. As to the taxes as mentioned on page 
five of plaintiffs' brief, it was stipulated by the parties 
in open court that the taxes hed been paid by the re-
spondents since 1907 on the strip of property in ques-
the property from the year 1933 until the present tiine. 
The taxes on this property had been paid double since 
1933. (Tr. 7). 
The principal issue as presented by the appellants 
'' si1nmers down to the respective rights of the plaintiffs 
and the appealing defendants in the narrow strip of land 
about a rod wide extending along the Southern boundary 
of the land owned by the appealing defendants Ashby 
and Christensen." The nature and effect of the Court's 
Findings, Conclusions and Decree as presented by the 
appellant on pages 6 and 7 of appellants' brief are some-
what in error in that that portion of the property lying 
within the public highway was specifically excluded in 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on page four 
paragraph one. 
The appellants state that the court found further 
that the defendant Christens ens ''have no right, title or 
interest and no right to use the property claimed by the 
plaintiffs as a highway or for a right of way in connec-
tion with the use of the property claimed.'' We find in 
the Decree that ''It is further ordered, adjusted and 
decreed that the said defendants have no estate, right, 
title or interest whatever in to said land and premises 
except as stated in said deed and that the title of plain-
tiffs is good and valid.'' (Page 2 of Decree). This 
gives the defendants the right to the right of way for 
road purposes across the property at a point approxi-
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1nately one-half the distance between the East and West 
points \\·here the gate exists in the said fence. The ap-
pellants further state on page 7 of their brief that there 
are no findings or conclusions as to what may pollute or 
\rhat has polluted the "\Vater. On page 3 of the Findings 
of :B., act, the court found ''that the defendants Briant E . 
... -\.~hby and Isabell C. Ashby have within the year before 
the filing· of this action either moved upon said property 
or pernri.tted the 1noving thereon of pigpens •:t: * * and 
that one said pigpen has been placed immediately ad-
jacent to the well house which said pigpen was complete-
ly or nearly co1npletely upon the above described prop-
erty." 
Further, the appellants say that the Decree in effect 
deprives those who purchase land to the North and East 
of Christensens from using the road which they have 
heretofore used in getting access to the public road to the 
South and prevents the crossing of the strip of land in 
question at all except at a point approximately one-half 
way between the well and East end of the strip decribed 
in the old Traugott deed. That this means that the 
Christensens and those East and North find themselves 
completely landlocked. This is not true in that parties 
North could use the right of way at the half-way mark. 
Christensens' property is very near to the East end of the 
respondents' property. Christensens' home is at least 
forty-three feet back from the road and is well back frorn 
the Wood property. 
POINT I 
The Respondents contend that the findings and de-
eree which lilnit the right of way over the Wood property 
to the location ''at a point approximately one-half of the 
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distance between the East and West points where the 
gate exists in the said fence" is proper and is supported 
by the evidence. Appellants contend that they are en-
titled to use respondents' land as they see fit going East 
and West on the land as well as 1naking 1nany roadways 
from North and South. Point one upon which the appel-
lants request a reversal of judgment is concerned with 
the construction of a deed. We quote fro1n the Traugott 
deed: 
''Reserving, however, to said grantors a right 
of way for road purposes across the above-described 
premises." (italics ours). 
The location of that crossing is shown by the only gate 
in the South fence which was approximately one-half way 
bet-vveen the East and West points and from that gate 
across the land was the only evident roadway, there being 
no evidence of a road or travel East and West on the said 
property. Respondent had never objected to the use of 
this right of way across the property. We quote the fol-
lowing law, to-wit: 
"It is said in Ritchey v. Welsh, 149 Ind. 214, 48 
N.E. 1031, that: 'When the way is once selected it 
cannot be changed by either party without the consent 
of the other' : Citing Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick. 102, 
5 Am. Dec. 302; Holmes v. Seely, 19 Wend. 507, 510; 
Morris vs. Edgington, 3 Taunt, 24; Goddard's l~aw of 
Easements, Bennett's Ed., 351. See, also, 2 Wash-
burn on Real Property, 4th ed., 306; Washburn on 
Easements and Servitudes, 4th ed., 258, 263. 
'Where the right to an easement is granted with-
out giving definite location and description to it, the 
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exercise of the easeutent in a particular course or 
utanner, \Yi th the consent of both parties, renders it 
fixed and eertain, and the dominant owner has no 
right after\\Tard. to u1ake ehanges affecting its loca-
tion, extent, or eharacter': 10 Ant. & Eng. Ency. of 
La\Y, :Zd Ed., 430 and cases cited in note 3" 95 A1n. 
St. Rep.~ Page 317. 
· ·1. Change of Location.-When a private 
right of \\Tay has been once selected and located, its 
location cannot be changed by either party; neither 
the owner of the land nor the owner of the easement, 
"Without the consent of the other party: Ritchey v. 
\\relsh, 1±9 lnd. 21±, ±8 N.E. 1031; Manning v. Port 
Reading R.R. Co., 54 N.J. Eq. ±6 33 Atl. 802; Gal-
loway v. \Vilder, 26 ~fich. 96. If a right of way is 
granted \vithout any designation of the place, it 
beco1nes located by usage for a length of time, and, 
after being so located, it cannot afterward be changed 
by the grantor without the consent of the grantee: 
vVynkoop v. Binger, 12 Johns. 222. The location of 
a private way detern1inted by agreement, usage, or 
acquiescence cannot be changed by one party without 
the consent of the other: Kurmuller v. ·Krotz, 18 
Iowa, 353. The grantee of a right of way has no right 
to change its location as often as he may think neces-
sary or at will: Moorhead v. Snyder, 31 Pa. St. 
514. 95 Am. St. Rep. 323. 
Appellants have claimed that Christensens have 
used a road extending from their house to the highway. 
The Christensens did not buy their land nor build their 
house until after appellant Briant E. Ashby bought the 
property· in 1947. There 1s no evidence that the pre-
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decessors in interest to Ashby ever clairned any right 
of way except through the one gate. The testimony of 
the witness Joyce Harrop, who was one of the O\Vners 
frorn whorn the appellants purchased, testified that he 
had traveled East and West to the orchard,. Upon being 
asked where he traveled, he pointed on the plat to an 
area North of the pipeline and the property owned by 
Woods. (Tr. 151). The intention of Traugott in his 
conveyance to Wood to give a fee sin1ple to the property 
with the reservation of the right of way was evidenced 
by the testin1ony of David Warren who had lived in 
Clearfield for sixty-nine years and who had worked for 
Traugott and who had been informed_by Traugott that 
he was to cultivate the Traugott land to the pipeline but 
not to go South of there because the land to the South 
belonged to Jim Wood. (Tr. 133). ~1r. Warren is a 
disinterested party and his testimony indicate_s that the 
intention was to give no more easement to the property 
but an absolute ownership to James G. Wood. 
Appellants cite case after case to the effect that 
''the subsequent owner of a part of such tenement has 
the right to use the way as appurtenant. to his particular 
part of the land. They contend that purchasers from 
Ashby have the benefit of the reservation for road pur-
poses. This is correct, but it is a right to use for road 
purposes that particular roadway or right of way 
through the gate and across the property. The reserva-
tion cannot be extended by giving as many rights of way 
as Ashby and his successors may desire. 
''Thus where a deed conveys an easement over 
certain land but fails to locate exactly the line over 
which the easement extends, parol evidence has been 
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held adinissable so to locate it. The general rule is 
that the location of an ease1nent once selected cannot 
be changed by either the land ovvner or the ease1nent 
O\Yner 'vithout the other's consent. The reason for 
this rule i8 that treating the location as variable, 
would incite litigation and depreciate the value and 
discourage the iinproven1ent of the land upon which 
the ease1nent is charged. Accordingly, a definite 
location of an ease1nent determines and limits the 
right of the grantee so that' he cannot again exercise 
a choice * * * Although the owner of an easement, 
such as a right of way, may do whatever is reason-
ably necessary to make it suitable and convenient 
for his use, he is not entitled to deviate therefrom.'' 
17 Am. Juris. 988-9. 
As a general rule, the location of a way of neces-
sity may be determined by an agreement which need 
not be in writing, but may be inferred from words 
or conduct, for example, where parties build a line 
fence up to the side of a road, but do not build across 
the road, setting a bar o'r gatepost on the side thereof, 
they will be held to have agreed upon such road as 
the location of a way of necessity.'' 17 Am. Juris. 
991-2. 
In the Wood case we have not only a gatepost but a 
gate. The location has been fixed. 
"There is _a rule, however, to the effect that the 
court should not change the location of a way after 
such has been fixed. * * * As already stated, with 
respect to easements in general, it is well settled that 
when the location of a way of necessity is once de-
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fined, both parties are bound by the lines so fixed; 
the owner of the dominant estate is not entitled to 
use any other way. The situation is the same as if 
there had been an express grant of the particular 
way. * * * Moreover, after. the location of such a way 
has been fixed, a court will not change it. * * * " 
1 7 Am. Juris. 991, Sections 94 & 95. 
In Hewitt vs. Parry, 34 N.E. (2) 489 cited by the ap-
pellants, we are concerned only with one easement and 
no others. 
In Sakansky et al. vs. Vein et al., N.H. 169 Atl., 1 also 
cited by the appellants as the law, allow us to read 
further in this case and on page three the court says: 
''The rule merely refuses to give unreasonable 
rights or to impose unreasonably burdens, when the 
parties, either actually or by legal implication, have 
spoken generally.'' 
Paragraph 6 on Page 3 reads as .follows: 
''In the case at bar the parties are bound by a 
contract which not only gave the dominant owner 
a way across the servient estate for the purpose of 
access to the rear of its premises, but also gave that 
way definite location upon the ground. The use 
which the plaintiff may make of the way is limited 
by the bounds of reason, but within those bounds it 
has the unlimited right to travel over the land set 
apart for a way. It has no right to insist upon the 
use of any other land of the defendants for a way, 
regardless of how necessary such other land may be 
to it and regardless; of how little change or incon-
venience such use of the defendant's land might oc-
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casiou to thern. · · (italics unrs). 
The above case \Va~ one where a deed gave a de-
finite right of \Yay 18 feet \\Tide over son1e land in 1849. 
The co~e ,,·as decided in 1933. The land owner desired 
to build an arch and then 
··Lay out a new way over level ground around 
the \vesterly end of the new building * * * to the same 
point on the do1ninant estate as the old way.'' 
The 1naster pernlitted both changes. The Supreme' Court 
states that the road could not be changed. 
\V e quote fron1 American Brass Company vs. S~rra, 
132 Atl. 656 which is also cited by the appellants. 
·'The cornpany in so doing used, without objec-
tion or hindrance, a passageway five or six feet wide 
over the servient tract. Since that time ( 1888-89) 
(these figures are not in the quote) this way has 
been clearly visible as evidenced by a vvell-defined 
course of wheel tracks * * * and by bars across the 
tracks at the entrance into the highway. As the 
grant of the passway did not fix the route, its loca-
tion vvas apparently deter1nined and thus established, 
in accord with the reasonable convenience of the 
dominant and servient owner, by practical location 
and use by the grantee, acquiesced in by the grantor 
at the time." 
Adan1s vs. Hodgkins 85 Atl., 530, is cited by the ap-
1Wllants. This case deals only with the question of ways 
llPressity and abandonrnent. There is no similarity to 
to the case at bar. Peck vs. Mackowsky 82 Atl. 199 is 
rited hy the appellants to show that th~ reservation for 
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right of way annexed to two parcels of ground. ~Iay it 
be pointed out, however; that the court held in that case 
that the two parcels of ground had a right to use the one 
passageway. In Bowers, et al. vs. Myers, et al., 85 Atl., 
860, no reference is made to additional right of ways. 
Methodist Protestant Church vs. Laws 7 Ohio CC 21, 
4 Ohio GS 562 cited by appellants merely points out that 
the tenants of a donrinant estate may use the right of way 
however 1nany the tenants may be. I call your attention 
to the bottom of page 13 of plaintiffs' brief in quoting 
the above which among other things states: 
"Provided the right can be enjoyed as to the 
separate parcels without any additional charge or 
burden to the proprietor or the servient tenement.'' 
We find no case, however, giving separate easements. 
It might be added that 
''In construing any grant of a right of way the 
use in connection and extent is limited to ·such as is 
reasonably necessary and convenient to the domi-
nant estate and as little burdensome as to the servient 
estate as possible for the use contemplated.'' l\1or-
ris vs. Blunt 161 P. 1127. 
Also see Nielsen vs. Sandberg, 141 P. (2) 696 which holds 
that: 
''An easement being a burden on the land which 
it traverses is limited to use by which it was ac-
quired and to the person who acquired it or for the 
benefit of the property for which it was acquired." 
A Utah case in point says: 
''The extent of an easement is deter1nined by the 
10 
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grant and once the character has been fixed no Inate-
rial change or enlarge1nent of the right acquired can 
be n1ade if thereby a greater burden is placed on the 
8erYient estate.'' Big Cottonwood Taylor Ditch Co. 
v~. Doyle 159 P. (2) 596 as modified 174 P. (2) ·148 . 
.. :B-,ailure to definitely locate and describe an ease-
lnent does not give grantee right to use servient estate 
without lin1itation.'' Cullison vs. Hotel Seaside, 268 
Pac. 7:-JS. In this san1e case "over grantor's land" was 
held to 1nean in a convenient, direct way. 
~Iinto vs. Salem Water Light & Power Company, 250 
P. 722; an Oregon case, held that the extent of the ease-
ment depended upon the proper construction of a grant 
\vithout consideration of extraneous circumstances where 
the language was unan1biguous. 
As to how the deed should be construed, Eastman vs. 
Church :219 S.\\r. (2) 406, a Kentucky case, holds that if 
an a1nbiguity or awkard provision in a deed including 
reservation or exception is capable of two .possible con-
structions one of which will be more favorable to grantee 
and the other to grantor all doubts are reserved in favor 
of grantee and the deed so construed. May we point out 
that Woods predecessors in interest were the grantees in 
the Traugott deed. 
Appellant states that the court's decision limits the 
right of way so as to be beneficial to only one narrow 
tract. This is not true. All the appellants need to do 
is use a portion of his own land as a roadway down to 
the right of way provided in the Decree of the court and 
as provided by the Traugott deed. It is apparent how-
ever, that the appellants prefer to travel over respond-
11 
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ents property destroying the use of that land rather than 
to apportion a small portion of their own land for a road-
way. As evidence that consideration was given to using 
their own land for roadvvay we find that shortly after this 
property was purchased by the appellants he had con-
tacted a Mr. Smith and a Mr. Allred and arranged for a 
building plan and arranged for a street to go through the 
center part of the land owned by the Ashbys lying North 
of the pipeline. See testin1ony of Mr. Briant Ashby. 
( Tr. 122). May I quote from his testimony: 
"Q. At one time, Mr. Ashby, you v.rere attenlpt-
ing and you did arrange for a building plan, and you 
did arrange for a street to go along through the cen-
ter part of the land lying North of the pipeline didn't 
you1 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. I take it you went so far as to employ Allred 
to build that building. 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. At that time you had a road running in an 
irregular line running down through the property at 
the center. 
A. I had about three different plans. 
Q. And you had a building facing this proposed 
new street~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And you had those building lots extended as 
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A. Yes sir. 
Q. ..:\.nd you told ~lr. Sn1ith and ~ir. Allred that 
you \Yere only to extend the lots to the pipeline didn't 
you1 
~\.. Providing there was an agreement made on 
that street and on that right of way." (Tr. 123). 
Calling your attention to plaintiffs' Exhibit "F". As 
sho'ru by the exhibit, the appellants had access to high-
'Nay 91 as their property adjoined the said highway on 
the West. The proposed roadway through appellants 
property w ..ould have given them ingress and egress to 
highway 91. Since that time, however, apparently appel-
lant has sold all but approximately three acres. ( Tr. 115) 
including that property abutting on highway 91 and is 
now asking for a separate right of way for each lot which 
he has sold or might sell. It has been his own doing if 
he has cut himself off from access to highway 91. He and 
the others \vho have purchased or may purchase from him 
do have a right of access to the road on the South over 
the designated right of way. The appellants were all in-
forined of the Woods claim to the property as shown by 
the testimony of Briant Ashby (Tr. 125 & 126) and 
LeRoy Christensen as shown by his testimony on Tr. 103 
and 104 in which he testified that Loy Wood and Melvin 
Wood had told him they owned property in front of his 
proposed building spot. He was so informed at the time 
he contemplated building. The fact that the Woods owned 
the property was of public record. At the time Briant 
Ashby contemplated the purchase of the property the evi-
dence indicates that he was informed by Joyce Harrop 
(Tr. 142 & 150) of the Wood's property. This was sup-
13 
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ported by the testi1nony of Howard Woods ('rr. 29 and 
30). Briant Ashby was informed by Woods of their clailn 
shortly after his purchase. ( Tr. 125 & 126). 
The predecessors in interest to Ashbys never made 
any claim of right to the property nor to a right of way 
other than that indicated by the gate in the fence which 
was a right of way across the property. Witness the 
testimony of Joyce Harrop. Mr. Harrop testified that he 
moved grapevines and peach trees at the request of the 
Woods. (Tr.138-139). He also testified that he 1nade no 
claim to the strip of land at the time he owned the Ashby 
property. (Tr. 140). This Inan knew what he was 
selling to the Ashbys. The deed which he signed did not 
contain that property which he intended to sell to Ashby. 
He had pointed out that which he intended to sell to Ash-
bys but the deed was prepared by the bank and this wit-
ness signed the same, probably unaware of what the 
deed conveyed. 
Alvin Wood testified that he used to visit the Wood 
property weekly or more often during a certain period 
of time to check on it and clean it up .. (Tr. 156). Mel-
vin Wood testified that he had worked on the property 
with his father (Tr. 78) who was predecessor in interest 
to the current owners. He testified that the right 
of way at the .gate was the only one used. (Tr. 86). 
Loy Wood testified that his father cultivated the land 
( Tr. 48 and 49) and that Clark, another predecessor in 
interest, asked permission to cultivate on occasion. (Tr. 
50). That they stopped "Brother Clark" from farn1ing 
it when tomatoes were being watered in such a manner 
as to seep through into the well. He also testified that 
he helped build the first fence (Tr. 52) and that the 
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second fence "?as built by Harrop::; after obtaining per-
Inission. 
Does this testiinony and this evidence indicate any-
thing other than a pleasant relationship between the 
do1ninant and serYient o'vners with no claiu1 by the 
don1inant o"~ners to anything other than the evident 
right of 'vay. 
POINT II 
.A .. 1nore careful exainination of the findings of the 
Court sho,vs that contrary to defendant's statement that 
the court found ·'that the defendants Christensen have no 
right of way across or right of access to the premises 
covered by the Traugott deed of 1907 the findings of the 
court were in fact that the Christensens had no right to 
use the property as a highway and for a right of way in 
connection with the use of the following described real 
estate owned by these answering defendants" (A use 
they had asserted in their counterclaim.) The described 
real estate describes the property of the defendants 
Christensen along with the property owned by the plain-
tiffs immediately South of Christensen's property. Thus 
the court deprives the defendant Christensens of a right 
of way ac.ross the property directly South of Christen-
sen's own property but Christensen is not deprived of a 
right of way at a point where the old gate is and these 
defendants and any who may purchase from the defend-




As to point three· of appellants' brief it is submitted 
that these findings which are objected to were supported 
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by the testiu1ony of Melvin Wood. ( Tr. 78) David War-
ren, ( Tr. 133) Joyce Harrop, ( Tr. 138, 139 and 140) Al-
vin Wood, ('rr. 156) Howard Hale, Lottie J. Clark, (Tr. 
· 38 & 40) Loy Wood, (Tr. 38 & 39 and Tr. 50, Tr. 52) 
David S. Warren, ( Tr. 133). The testin1ony of those 
named above other than the Woods and Warren was to 
the effect that they made no claim on the property. They 
were all the predecessors in interest to the Ashbys. The 
wood testimony all substantiated the fact that they 
claimed the property as their own since the purchase by 
their father, who was their predecessor in interest. The 
testimony of Mr. Warren showed that after the time of 
the conveyance from Traugott to Wood that Traugott 
made no claim to the property. As a counterclaim these 
two defendants plead that they were in the open, notor-
ious, adverse, hostile, uninterrupted, continuous, exclu-
sive, unmolested and undisputed possession of the said 
property, including this property lying South of the pipe-
line. The dependants, LeRoy Christensen and his wife, 
Wilma C. Christensen, filed a separate answer based 
upon the same defense as Briant E. Ashby and Isabell C. 
Ashby clai1ned and in addition plead that they had built 
a house on the property in question, but the testi1nony of 
Mr. Christensen showed that his house was well North of 
. the pipeline. 
May we call the court's attention to Title 104, Article 
2 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943. We quote 104-2-5, 
as amended, the amendment not referring to actions of 
this kind. 
''Seisin or possession within Seven Years N eces-
sary. No action for the recovery of r.eal property or 
for the possession thereof shall be Inaintained, unless 
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it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or 
predecessor \Yas seised or possessed of the property 
in question \\rithin seven years before the conunence-
Inent of the action.'' 
Like,vise, 10-1-2-6 states that no defense or counterclaim 
shall be effectual unless it appears that the person inter-
posing the defense or counterclaim or the predecessor 
or grantor \vas seized or possessed of the property in 
question \vithin seven years. 
We next call the court's attention to 104-2-7 to the 
effect that the person establishing a legal title to the 
property shall be presumed to have been possessed 
thereof ·within the time required by law, and the accupa-
tion of the property by any other person shall be deemed 
to have been under and in subordination to the legal title 
unless it appears that the property has been held and 
possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years 
before the commencement of the action. 
104-2-9 sho"\VS· what constitutes adverse possession 
under a written instrument, and 104-2-12 reads as fol 
lows: 
''In no case shall adverse possession be con-
sidered established under the provisions of any sec-
tion of this code, unless it shall be shown that the 
land has been occupied and claimed for the period of 
seven years continuously, and that the party, his 
predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which 
have been levied and assessed upon such land ac-
cording to law.'' 
May we consider the evidence to show which party 
has been in the open, notorious and adverse possession 
17 
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of the property lying South of the pipeline. In 1907 
James G. Wood was granted this property by warranty 
deed from the Traugotts. There was no dispute regard-
ing this statement. Various conveyances were n1ade of 
the property in question after 1907, and all conveyances 
were 1nade subject to the James G. Wood deed. In 1932 
the Clarks deeded -part .of the southwest quarter to the 
Harrops but did not except the Wood land, and the deed 
did not make any reference to the well, pipeline, water 
rights or the land South of the well nor to the one-half 
rod immediately north of the pipeline. 
In the trial of the case the appellants at no ti1ne 
denied the rights of the plaintiffs to the water rights, 
the pipelines, the one-half rod right of way and the well. 
The deed in question, therefore, from Clarks to the Har-
rops clearly and without question included rights pos-
sessed by the Woods and not denied by the defendants. 
Mr. Clark is dead, but Mrs. Clark on the witness stand 
testified that the Clarks did not claim any ownership 
in the water system nor in the land South of the pipeline. 
She testified on cross examination that they had cul-
tivated at various times the land South of the pipeline 
but that they always acknowledged that it was owned by 
the Wood family. 
The Harrops owned the property from 1932 until 
they sold it to Mr. and Mrs. Ashby in 1947. The exact 
description was used in the Harrop-Ashby deed that had 
been used in the Clark-Harrop deed. Mr. Joyce Harrop 
was subpoenaed by the appellants but was called by the 
respondents and testified that the Harrops had the prop-
erty surveyed shortly after they had purchased it in 
1932, and that they found that the Woods had the water 
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rights and the one-half rod right of way North of the 
pipeline, and that the \\roods were the owners of the land 
South of the pipeline and surrounding the well. He testi-
fied that during all of the tune from 1933 to 194 7 the Har-
rop fanrily recognized and admitted that the Wood family 
owned the said land and also had the water rights. 
Then \Ve have Briant Ashby testifying that he knew 
nothing about the \\rood claims until. he purchased the 
property in 19± 7. He testified that he had no conversa-
tion with Joyce Harrop before he purchased it. And yet 
on cross examination, after great hesitancy he finally ad-
Initted that Joyce Harrop and he had walked over all of 
the land in question and that Mr. Harrop had shown him 
the property that he was purchasing. How could Joyce 
Harrop and Briant Ashby walk over all of this ground 
without Ashby seeing at least the well and without his 
observing that at least the great majority of the orchard 
which he was buying extended only to a distance north 
of the pipeline~ 
On the extreme East of the property where Christen-
sens' house is located, Mr. Christensen testified that he 
removed three peach trees from in front and a trifle 
to the West of his house. To us it appears that the testi-
Inony of Joyce Harrop is amply supported. When he 
testified that he and his fa1nily at all times between 1933 
and 1947 recognized that the property belonged to the 
Wood family, he was testifying against his own interest. 
Counsel for the defense recognized this testimony against 
interests when he asked permission to make the Clarks 
and the Harrops parties defendants. If there were any 
adverse possession, it did not commence until after the 
Ashhys purchased the ground, and Briant Ashby testified 
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that he only cultivated the ground South of the pipeline 
for one year. That was in 1948. Considering the Utah 
law regarding adverse possession, we can see how the 
Ashbys failed in their defense on that ground. This evi-
dence supports Respondents' title not only by legal title 
but by undisputed possession since 1907 until 1948. 
As to the error alleged in second paragraph of find-
ing 1 on page 4, the finding was certainly supported by 
the evidence. The appellants maintained that the fence 
was built by them and their predecessors in interest. The 
evidence, which was undisputed, showed that the first 
fence was built by James G. Wood and his sons. (Tr. 
152). His sons are now the respondents. That fence con-
tinued to stand there until during Harrops' ownership 
of the land North of the pipeline. During the latter part 
of their ownership they asked permission of the Wood 
family to change the fence and move the same Southward 
in order to overcome the danger to anin1al and human 
life. (Alvin Wood Tr. 156 and 157). The distance be-
tween the ditch, which was known as Swift Creek, and 
the existing fence was narrow, and it was recognized a~ 
a dangerous place. The fence was then moved under 
permission of the Wood family, and it was placed ap-
proximately three feet onto the highway. The ditch 
has since that time been piped. The testimony of pre-
decessors in interest to Ashby, Joyce Harrop and Lottie 
J. Clark show that they made no clailn to the property. 
The question of the double payment of taxes was 
settled by stipulation at the commencement of the trial. 
The finding number 2 on page 4 is substantiated by 
the testimony of the predecessors in interest to Ashh~· 
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who testified that if they gre\Y crops it 'vas per1nissive 
and that it \YHS often interrupted by the vV oods. Joyce 
1-larrop, (rrr. 13S-139) Lottie J. Clark, (Tr. -±0). The 
saHte testilnony goes to prove the further findings on 
page 5 and 6 along \Yith the testin1ony of the Woods to 
the effect that they had built the fence themselves. As 
to the findings nun1ber 5 on page 7 respondent finds it 
difficult to reconcile appellants state1nent that ''the evi! 
dence sho,ved the plaintiffs (respondents) have an un-
disputed interest in the land in question.'' The respond-
ents certainly haYe an interest but the same was being 
disputed by the appellants to the extent that they were 
putting further right of ways across the property and 
were allowing pig pens to be moved from their land onto 
the \Yoods property and the appellants removed the 
fence which the respondents attempted to build to pro-
tect their property. The mere fact that this suit had 
to be filled to protect against his claim indicates that 
the appellants were assorting some claim to the prop-
erty. 
The findings number 1 on page 8 is supported by the 
testimony of the predecessors in interest in which none 
claimed any right or title to the property other than the 
right of way across the property as provided by the deed. 
As to the errors alleged in findings number 6 and 7 
on page 10, we find from the testimony of the appellant 
Christensen himself that he was informed of the rights 
of the respondent by Loy and Melvin Wood when ''he 
wa~ conte1nplating building" (Tr. 103-104) also the 
ownership of the Woods was a matter of public record. 
As to elai1ning an open, notorious, adverse, hostile; un-
interrupted, peaceable, continuous, exclusive, un-
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rnolested and undisputed possession of said property 
the evidence shows that up until the tilne of the purchase 
by Ashbys such were the existing conditions. At the 
time of the purchase by Ashby the respondents informed 
hin1 of their property right. They had an attorney write 
the appellants informing them of the property rights, 
as testified by Briant Ashby. (Tr. 126). When these 
means were not sufficient to keep the appellants fron1 
interfering with the property respondents con11nenced 
building a fence which was ripped out by the defendants. 
Respondents used every Ineans short of force to protect 
their rights. 
What further action need a land owner take to 
inform someone of his rights to the land. The Woods 
had every reason to believe that they could get along 
with the adjoining land owners as they had done for 
many, many years. When they found that the above 
means were insufficient to protect their rights, a suit 
was filed. 
POINT IV 
The evidence supporting the conclusions of law have 
been discussed elsewhere in this brief. It can only be 
reiterated that the right of way as established by the 
court was the right of way which had been used since- the 
original conveyance by Traugott to Wood. It has been 
established that there cannot be a new and different 
right of way created for each new piece of property. 
The error claimed in conclusion two on page 11 
avers that there has been an improper construction of 
the deed. This also was discussed elsewhere and it can 
only be repeated that the deed could in no way be con-
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strued to be a right to travel unrestrained in any direc-
tion over the \\roods property. If this had been the intent 
the ''T oods \vould have been given merely an easement 
a right to the water but would not have been given 
a warranty deed with a right of way to one-half rod 
on the North. .A.s to the pollution it would be impos-
sible to designate all iten1s \vhich may pollute the water. 
Until the advent of the Ashbys, reasonable use o£ the 
property North of the pipeline was made by Ashby's ·pre-
decessors in interest and there was no quarrel. The 
respondents were reasonable in their requests and the 
ovvners of the property adjacent were reasonable in their 
acquiscence. Upon the advent of the Ashbys, however, 
they i1mnediately began to misuse and abuse the Wood 
property as well as the property adjacent in such a way 
that it 1nay pollute the water supply. 
POINT V 
As to point V of appellants' brief there was evi-
dence of pig droppings, pig pens and other items 
brought adjacent to the well house and upon the land 
belonging to Woods, with manure several inches deep. 
This certainly was evidence of an item which could pol-
lute the water. 
POINT VI 
As to point VI, the court does not treat the appel-
lants as trespassing strangers completely. They treat 
then1 as trespassers who have a right to utilize a right 
of 'vay across the property, but who have gone further 
than utilizing the right of way. They have allowed filth 
to be moved upon the Wood property or upon their own 
property so adjacent to the Woods vvell property as to 
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pollute the waters and they are claiuilng innu1nerable 
rights of way. There is no reason why the Woods cannot 
build a fence along. the North side of their own property 
leaving a road across for ingress and egress as required 
by the court's findings and Decree. There was no evi-
dence brought before the court of a deep trench on the 
North of the strip. Such a trench however was constructed 
since the suit to ward away excessive irrigation waters 
used by defendants Ashby and Christensen. The trench 
has been filled in by Christensens as soon as it is dug 
however. As this trench is on the property owned by 
the Woods and as long as this does not interfere vvith the 
right of way given, it certainly is a proper use of their 
own property. This is not a question of respondents act-
ing as" dogs in the rnanger" as rnaintained by the appel-
lants; rather, it is a question of the owners right to utilize 
his own property without interference from trespassers 
who desire to utilize his neighbor's property for road pur-
poses in order that it will not be necessary to utilize his 
own. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The testimony, the original deed, and the account~ 
of the parties establish the fact that the Wood family is 
the owner in fee of the property lying South of the pipe-
line; and that they have a right of way over the one-half 
rod of land immediately North of the pipeline; and that 
they are entitled to continue the use of unconta1ninated 
water for the eight residences it supplies. There is, of 
course, the right of way (not rights of way) in the present 
owners of the land to the North. The evidence has shown 
that appellants had ample means of ingress and egress to 
their property through highway 91 which abutted on the 
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\Vest or over the regular right of 'vay on Woods propertyo 
That they had infor1nation of the Woods ownership of 
the property. rrhat they had in fact platted their prop-
erty sho,ving the 1neans of ingress and egress to be ·from 
hio-h,yav 91 or fro1n the North. That in the face ot this b "' 
apparently they have sold their property abutting on 
highway 91. That they have sold out other property 
reserving approxil11ately three acres for themselves. That 
they have 1neans of ingress and egress to this property 
through the right of 'vay over the Wood property as 
designated by the lo,ver court. That they now desire to 
1nake a 1nockery of the \\'"?" ood ownership of their property 
by having unlin1ited right of travel back and forth over 
this property. The fact that the Woods have desired to 
keep this property free of anything other than the one 
right of way Inakes good sense in their utilization of the 
property. Proper Inaintenance of the pipe and of the 
water system may require deep excavations all through 
Woods property. Driveways, right of ways, roads, exces-
sive watering of lawns all would tend to make the utiliza-
tion by Woods of the property difficult. Excessive water-
ing of tomatoes by Mr. Clark who had been permitted to 
plant tomatoes on the property, caused sufficient troubles 
that ''Brother Clark was forbidden to plant any more 
tomatoes thereon. 
The history of Utah is, as in all the arid Western ter-
ritory, a history of the development of the water supply 
and the developn1ent of the state has been in direct ratio 
to the water supply made available. Land in the West 
ean only be utilized when there is "\Vater to supply it. The 
1Iayor of Clearfield ( Tr. 85) testified that they could not 
supply culinary water for the one hundred sixty acres of 
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ground to which this spring water runs. To let this water 
became polluted and unaccessible is not in keeping with 
the culinary water requirements of this territory. To 
allow many rights of way to develop fron1 one right of 
way is inconsistent with the fee simple ownership of the 
respondents to the strip of la~d in question. 
We submit that the judgment and decree of the lo,ver 
court should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RALPH J. LOWE 
Attorney .for Respondents 
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